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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BIG WOOD RANCH, LLC, 
V. 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
Appellant, 
WATER USERS' ASSOCIATION OF 
THE BROAD FORD SLOUGH AND 
ROCKWELL BYPASS LATERAL 
DITCHES, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, ) 
Respondent. ) 
--------------) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 41265 
Blaine County Case No. CV 2010-842 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State ofldaho, in and for Blaine County 
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge, Presiding 
Gary D. Slette 
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1906 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1906 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Richard C. Boardman/ Erika E. Malmen 
PERKINS C0IE, LLP 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702-5391 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Respondent, Water Users' Association of the Broadford Slough and Rockwell Bypass 
Lateral Ditches, Inc. ("Association"), is incorporated in Idaho for purposes of delivering its 
members' water rights from the Big Wood River. The Association maintains the diversion works 
and ditches of the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass, and charges assessments for those 
functions pursuant to statutory provisions of the Idaho Code. When the Appellant, Big Wood 
Ranch, LLC ("BWR"), failed to pay its assessment, the Association commenced a small claims 
action seeking to recover the amounts claimed to be due and owing by BWR. BWR thereafter 
filed a declaratory judgment action seeking the court's determination that the Association was not 
validly formed under the statute, and was therefore not entitled to impose assessments. The 
Association counterclaimed for declaratory relief relative to the validity of its formation, and the 
recovery of its unpaid assessments. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
The Association generally agrees with BWR's recitation of the proceedings in this 
matter with the following noted exceptions and observations. This matter actually commenced 
with BWR's Motion to Transfer and Consolidate Small Claims Case as a result of a magistrate 
case that had been commenced by the Association. R., Vol. 1, pp. 16-20. 
With regard to the statement that the trial was conducted "on November 13, 2012, 
December 18, 2012, and January 4, 2013," trial certainly commenced on November 13, 2012, 
albeit with the proclaimed "awkward situation" of BWR's failure to attend the trial it demanded 
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despite having been expressly advised by its counsel of the trial date. Tr., p. 13, LL. 23-25. The 
sole and managing member ofBWR, Marc Richards, was in Hawaii. Tr., p. 14, L. 11. 
The trial was continued until December 18, 2012, but Mr. Richards failed to appear in 
court for a second time because he was again in Hawaii. Tr., p. 253, LL. 14-25; p. 254, LL. 1-
25; p. 255, LL. 1-22. As a result of Mr. Richards' failure to appear for the trial a second time, 
the court ordered him to pay the Association's costs and attorney fees for time involved in 
preparation and travel. Tr., p. 263, LL. 2-12. The trial finally concluded on January 4, 2013, 
when Mr. Richards decided he would participate. 
Following the trial, the court granted judgment to the Association for delinquent 
assessments in the amount of $9,500, together with a statutory penalty of ten percent (10%) 
added to each such delinquent assessment, together with interest on the total amount due at the 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-1304. R., Vol. 2, pp. 404-05. 
An Amended Judgment was subsequently entered in which the Association was awarded costs 
as a matter of right in the amount of $2,209.19, and attorney fees in the amount of $67,075 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-1307. R., Vol. 2, pp. 437-38. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
The Association was formed pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1301, et seq. Articles of 
Incorporation of the Association were filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May 3, 2002. The 
Bylaws of the Association had previously been adopted on April 16, 2002, after notice had been 
provided to the owners of water rights on the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass. A list 
of those original individuals who formed the Association is attached as Exhibit "D" to the 
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Affidavit of Marc Reinemann. R., Vol. 1, pp. 128-9. BWR has admitted in its discovery responses 
that the Rockwell Bypass is a man-made ditch. (See Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Gary D. 
Slette. R., Vol. 1, p. 64.) The Rockwell Bypass was constructed as a result of a judicial decree for 
purposes of "saving" water. (See Irvin E. Rockwell v. Mans Coffin decree dated August 25, 1949, 
and recorded in Book 12 of Judgments, page 115, Blaine County, Idaho, attached to the Affidavit 
of Gary D. Slette as Exhibit "B" [hereinafter the "Rockwell Decree"]. R., Vol. 1, pp. 67-81.) The 
water rights delivered by the Association are first diverted out of the Big Wood River into the 
Broadford Slough ditch. That water is subsequently diverted out of that ditch approximately a half 
mile downstream at the Rockwell Bypass headgate. (See Affidavit of District 37 Watermaster 
KevinLakeyatR., Vol. l,p.115 at,r7;seealsoAffidavitofBrianBrocketteatR., Vol. l,p.132 
at ,r 6. With regard to the half mile separation between the river and the Rockwell Bypass 
headgate, see Tr., p. 56, LL. 1-8 and Tr., p. 244, LL. 2-8, LL. 12-14.) There is no disagreement 
that the Rockwell Bypass is a man-made ditch and that the surface irrigation water that flows 
therein is first diverted out of the river and through a headgate on the Broadford Slough. See 
Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 18-19 at fn. 7. BWR's surface water rights are diverted out of the 
Rockwell Bypass. 
In 2006, BWR purchased its property on Broadford Road near Bellevue, Idaho. See 
Deposition of Marc Richards. R., Vol. 1, p. 328 at ,r 6, LL. 20-23. Marc Richards is the sole 
member and managing member of BWR. Id at ,r 7, LL. 1-5. BWR's property was previously 
owned by Jann Wenner ("Wenner"). Id. at p. 10, LL. 22-23. Wenner was one of the original 
members of the Association as identified on Exhibit 11D 11 to the Affidavit of Marc Reinemann. R., 
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Vol. 1, p. 128-9. Wenner had paid the Association's invoices for water delivery when he owned 
the property. R., Vol. 2, p. 3 94 at ,r 9. The total acreage that B WR purchased from Wenner is 117 
acres. Id at p. 39, LL. 23-25 and p. 40, L. I. BWR paid Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000) for its 
property. Id at p. 40, LL. 17-18. Richards purchased the $5,000,000 property sight unseen, and 
admitted that he never inspected the property prior to its purchase. Id at p. 14, LL. 21-23. 
Richards further admitted that he did nothing with regard to analyzing the water rights on the 
property or the delivery system prior to that purchase. Id. at p. 15, LL. 19-25; p. 16, LL. 1-2. See 
also Tr., p. 306, LL. 17-25; p. 307, LL. 1-4; and p. 311, LL. 3-8. In the court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law following the trial in this matter, the court stated the following in Finding 
of Fact No. 10: 
Marc Richards ("Richards") is the sole member and the managing 
member of Big Wood Ranch. Big Wood Ranch purchased its 
property and water rights from Wenner for Five Million Dollars 
($5,000,000) in 2006, sight unseen. The Purchase and Sale 
Agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit 40) contained a provision expressly 
advising Big Wood Ranch to seek advice regarding the validity, 
quality and quantity of any water right acquired with the real estate it 
purchased. It also provided that, "Buyer must verify same during the 
inspection period." Neither Plaintiff nor Richards ever researched or 
verified any issues pertaining to the property's water rights, or their 
means of conveyance or delivery, prior to the time that Big Wood 
Ranch purchased the property. 
R., Vol. 2, p. 394. 
Because Jann Wenner lived in New York, Wenner had authorized Robert "Archie" 
Bouttier, another original Association member, to irrigate and farm the property for him. R., Vol. 
2, pp. 393-94 at ,r 8. After BWR purchased the property, Marc Richards met with Bouttier and 
advised him to continue doing what he had been doing for Wenner with regard to the property. R., 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Vol. 2, p. 394 at ,i 11. As a result of the active irrigation and grazing of the property, Marc 
Richards personally claimed an agricultural tax exemption from Blaine County based on irrigated 
farming and grazing. R., Vol. 2, p. 399 at ,i 23. When the Association sent invoices to BWR for 
charges related to the delivery ofBWR's irrigation water, BWR refused to pay the same. 
The focus of BWR's Complaint and arguments to the district court centered on the 
allegation that the Broadford Slough was a natural stream, and that, therefore, the Association had 
not been validly formed for purposes of providing delivery of irrigation water rights as a lateral 
ditch water users' association. The Association disagreed with BWR's contention which led to the 
trial that was conducted in this case. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
l. Should the Association be awarded its costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 42-1307, 12-120(1), 12-120(3), 12-121, and I.A.R. Rules 40 and 41? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Association was validly formed for purposes of maintaining the water delivery 
system of its members. 
In his Affidavit, Marc Reinemann, the secretary-treasurer of the Association, described 
the operation of the water delivery system as follows: 
12. The Association operates the Rockwell Bypass ditch 
and the Broadford Slough ditch as a single unified lateral ditch 
system for the water users whose water is transported by those 
ditches. All of the irrigation waters are diverted at one point on the 
Broadford Slough where the Rockwell Bypass headgate is located, 
and such water is transported in ditches for delivery to the 
respective places of use as identified in water rights. 
Stipulation to Augment Record dated March 17, 2014, Exh. A at, 12. The water for all of the 
water users in the Association is diverted out of the Big Wood River into a ditch known as the 
Broadford Slough and then subsequently diverted into the Rockwell Bypass. In referring to 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 41 at the trial, he described the ditch that comes off the Big Wood River 
which is controlled by the Broadford Slough headgate. Tr., p. 55, LL. 1-23. According to Brian 
Brockette, the Association's lateral ditch manager, the Broadford Slough headgate is 250-300 
yards below the point where the water is diverted out of the Big Wood River. Tr., p. 243, LL. 9-
16. From the point where water is taken out of the river, the Rockwell Bypass headgate is 
located approximately one-half mile down the Broadford Slough channel. Tr., p. 56, LL. 1-8. 
Brockette concurred with the estimated ditch length between the Big Wood River and the 
Rockwell Bypass headgate. Tr., p. 244, LL. 2-8. The water is then conveyed down the Rockwell 
Bypass and distributed to the water right holders' respective premises. 
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As specifically found by the district court, the channels of the Broadford Slough and the 
Rockwell Bypass were subject to silt accumulation, downed trees and beaver dams. R., Vol. 2, 
p. 395 at ~ 14. In order to facilitate irrigation water diversion into the slough ditch, it was 
necessary to do work within the stream channel of the Big Wood River. This was because of the 
sand and gravel accretions and river debris that accumulated at the entrance to the ditch that 
leads to the headgate on the Broadford Slough. Id. The court found, after hearing the relevant 
testimony, that without such maintenance activities being performed by the Association, the 
members' water rights would be incapable of being diverted, conveyed or delivered in periods 
of low river flow during the irrigation season. Id. Dr. Charles E. Brockway stated in his 
Affidavit that man-made flow obstructions and beaver dams impeded flow in the Broadford 
Slough which prevented authorized diversions of irrigation rights. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at~ 6. 
Brian Brockette, the Association's lateral ditch manager, attested to the work that was required 
to be accomplished. An example of the debris that caused problems for the Association can be 
found in his Affidavit. R., Vol. 1, pp. 134-135. An example of the work that had to be done in 
the channel of the Big Wood River is also attached to his Affidavit. R., Vol. 1, pp. 136-139. 
Robert "Archie" Bouttier testified that prior to the formation of the Association, he 
owned a backhoe, and that if there was a beaver dam blocking a ditch, he would respond to a 
phone call and remove the beaver dam. Tr., p. 152, LL. 1-4. However, that informal approach to 
the provision of system maintenance proved to be insufficient. Marc Reinemann, the 
secretary/treasurer of the Association, testified that a majority of the work that is required to be 
done by the Association annually occurs above the Rockwell Bypass headgate in the Broadford 
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Slough ditch. Tr., p. 79, LL. 2-6. Reinemann testified that Brian Brockette had been employed 
by the Association as the lateral ditch manager. Tr., p. 87, LL. 18-24. He described the duties of 
Brockette as being responsible to make certain that both the Rockwell Bypass and the 
Broadford Slough were capable of conveying water in response to calls from water users to tum 
in their water. Tr., p. 88, LL. 11-23. In addition to doing repairs and debris removal from the 
channels, he was also responsible for removal of beavers that created problems for water 
delivery. Tr., p. 88, LL. 24-25; p. 89, LL. 1-12. Reinemann also testified that Brockette had 
been appointed a Deputy Watermaster for District 37 to allow him authority to go on property 
belonging to others where the Broadford Slough passed, but where those individuals were not 
water right holders. Tr., p. 90, LL. 15-24. Reinemann testified that if the work that related to the 
Association's expenditures above the Rockwell Bypass headgate wasn't performed, there would 
be no water flow into the Rockwell Bypass. Tr., p. 107, LL. 18-25; p. 108, LL. 1-3. He further 
testified that if beaver dams plugged the Broadford Slough above the bypass, flooding would 
occur. Tr., p. 108, LL. 4-7. 
Kevin Lakey, the District 37 Watermaster, testified that neither the IDWR nor Water 
District 3 7 had any responsibility for delivering irrigation water below the Broadford Slough 
and Rockwell Bypass headgates. Tr., p. 190, LL. 2-15. He testified that Water District No. 37 
did not pay Brockette anything for his role as a Deputy Watermaster. Tr., p. 198, LL. 22-24. 
Brian Brockette had been appointed as a Deputy Watermaster to prevent claims of trespass. Tr., 
p. 205, LL. 21-24. Brian Brockette confirmed that his appointment as a Deputy Watermaster 
was to prevent claims of trespassing by non-members of the Association. Tr., p. 232, LL. 1-7. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
The need for the Association's formation was apparent, because without an organized 
effort, the ability to deliver water was going to be severely impacted. As observed by Dr. 
Brockway, the water users on the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass had become 
increasingly concerned about the creation of aesthetic ponds and other flow obstructions that 
had prevented water users from obtaining their decreed diversion rates. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at 16. 
The informal arrangement whereby Robert Bouttier had previously used his backhoe to remove 
a beaver darn or an obstruction of one sort or another was no longer a viable long-term solution. 
As the court observed in its findings, someone had to perform the routine and regular 
maintenance of work within the stream channel of the Big Wood River in accordance with 
Idaho Code§ 42-3806. R., Vol. 2, p. 395 at 1 14. It was apparent that something needed to be 
done, and the group of water users identified by Mr. Reinemann in his Affidavit banded 
together to form the Association. 
B. Idaho Code§ 42-1301. 
BWR's main contention is that the court erred when it concluded that the Broadford 
Slough was a "canal", i.e., not a natural watercourse, for purposes of meeting the statutory 
requirements ofldaho Code § 42-1301. In parsing the words of the statute, BWR contends that 
the characterization of the slough's channel as a "canal" meant that it was not a "lateral" or a 
"ditch." The district court expressly found that the terms "ditch" and "canal" are synonymous 
with one another. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at 120. At trial, the Association observed that numerous 
Idaho statutes group ditches, canals or other conduits into a single category. See, e.g., Idaho 
Code §§ 42-1102, 42-1104, 42-1106, 42-1108, 42-1201, 42-1202, and 42-1203. The 
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Association argued that BWR's argument over the terminology was a distinction without a 
difference for purposes of compliance with Idaho Code§ 42-1301. 
C. The issue of Broadford Slough not being a natural stream was already decided in 
the Rockwell Decree. 
The characterization of the Broadford Slough as not being a natural channel appears to 
have been addressed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the Rockwell 
Decree in 1949. In those Findings, District Judge Glennon stated: 
VIII 
That from the time said waters were first put to beneficial use 
by the plaintiff herein, the same have been diverted from Big Wood 
River through canals and ditches leading from said Big Wood 
River to the lands described in paragraphs IV and V hereof, and 
were diverted from said river by and through the defendant 
Watermaster and at the special request of the plaintiff herein, and 
that the defendant, on his own behalf and the appropriators of the 
waters of Big Wood River have recognized plaintiffs right in and to 
the waters hereinbefore set forth, and the right of Plaintiffs use 
thereof, and have consented and acquiesced therein. 
(Emphasis added). Id at VIII. The only way the water identified in the Rockwell Decree gets to its 
place of use is by a diversion out of the river "through canals and ditches leading from said Big 
Wood River." The diversion of water from the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough is 
consistent with the observations of long-time Bellevue area residents who attested to the prior 
existence of a wooden headgate structure on the Big Wood River in the 1950's at the point where 
the Broadford Slough ditch begins. Because the issue was already decided in the Rockwell 
Decree, the court's judgment in favor of the Association on this issue was appropriate. 
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D. The evidence in the record supported the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
The Association contends that the evidence it submitted in the form of various Affidavits 
substantiated that the Broadford Slough is not a natural stream, and that the Association had been 
validly formed to conduct its activities as a water delivery organization. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-
171. Assuming, arguendo, that the Broadford Slough was a natural stream at some unknown time 
in history, the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101, 524 
P.2d 1073 (1974) is instructive on the issue asserted by BWR in this action. In Dayley, supra, the 
City of Burley sought to discharge surface waters into Goose Creek. The Court noted that while 
Goose Creek was formerly a natural stream, a dam had been constructed across the stream near 
Oakley. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Goose Creek channel had been so 
altered so as to have lost its character as a natural channel. The same is true in the instant case. 
According to the Affidavit of Ed Cameron, the point at which water was diverted out of 
the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough in the 19501s was regulated by a wooden headgate 
that he personally observed. R., Vol. 1, p. 143 at 1 4. Some time in the 1950's or 19601s, a flood 
event occurred that destroyed the wooden headgate. Id Thereafter, the Army Corps of Engineers 
constructed a levee across the banks of the Big Wood River and installed a new headgate. Id. at 1 
5. See also, Affidavit of Kevin Lakey which evidenced the existence of a lockable and 
controllable headgate on the ditch. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at 1 5. 
The Affidavit of long-time Bellevue resident, Leroy Lewis, attested to the fact that the 
slough was previously dried up during the winter months to prevent flooding in the Broadford 
area. R., Vol. 1, p. 109 at, 5. He had personally observed the old original headgate, and he knew 
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the Broadford Slough was controlled by that headgate because no water was allowed to flow 
down the Broadford Slough ditch during the winter. Id 
The Affidavit of Lee Peterson, the former Water Master for Water Districts 37 and 37M, 
acknowledged the existence of a lockable headgate, and the IDWR's posture that the Broadford 
Slough and the Rockwell Bypass were regarded as ditches used for the delivery of water rights. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 106 at ,r 5. Although work within the ditch system had to be undertaken from time to 
time to keep water flowing to permit delivery of the water rights, Peterson attested to the fact that 
he was unaware that any stream channel alteration permits had ever been sought or required from 
the IDWR for such purposes. Id at ,r 6. 
The Affidavit of Terry Blau presents more compelling evidence that the upper sections of 
the Broadford Slough above the Rockwell Bypass was not regarded as natural streams. R., Vol. 1, 
pp. 82-84. Mr. Blau was employed by the IDWR for 35 years, and he administered the Stream 
Channel Protection Program. Id at ,r 2. He administered that program for the IDWR on natural 
channels in Blaine County. Id at ,r 2. He attested to his familiarity with both the Broadford Slough 
and the Rockwell Bypass, and the lockable headgate device for the Broadford Slough. Id. at ,r 3. 
Importantly, Mr. Blau further attested to the fact that during his 35-year employment with the 
IDWR, the area of the Broadford Slough where water was diverted out of the Big Wood River 
was not considered to be a natural stream. Id at ,r 5. 
The Affidavit of Kevin Lakey attests to his current role as the Water Master for Districts 
37 and 37M in Blaine County. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ,r 3. In that capacity, he was familiar with 
water right administration on the Big Wood River, the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell 
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Bypass. From a review of the IDWR records, he was able to ascertain that the Army Corps of 
Engineers constructed a levee on the Big Wood River at the point where the Broadford Slough 
ditch had its origin. Id at 1 5. He was also aware that a lockable and controllable headgate was 
installed to regulate irrigation diversions. Id Paragraph 7 of his Affidavit reads as follows: 
7. During the irrigation season, all irrigation water 
rights that are delivered through the Bypass are diverted from the 
River, and the volume of such rights is controlled by means of the 
headgate on the Slough. Another headgate is located immediately 
below the Slough headgate, and serves as the diversion point for 
the Bypass. An irrigation check structure is located immediately 
adjacent to the Bypass headgate as shown in the photograph 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". During the irrigation season, boards 
are placed in that structure so that no flow is allowed to go down 
the Slough, and all water diverted out of the River must flow down 
the Bypass for water right delivery. 
Id The photograph attached as Exhibit "A" to his Affidavit depicts conditions as they exist during 
the entire irrigation season when no water is permitted to run down the Broadford Slough ditch, 
with all water diverted out of the Big Wood River necessarily flowing down the Rockwell Bypass 
for delivery to Association members. R., Vol. 1, p. 117. Mr. Lakey attested to the substantial 
amount of work that has been done and the improvements that have been made by the Association 
on both the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass ditches. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at 1 8. Mr. 
Lakey acknowledged that the Association's role in managing the delivery of water rights on the 
Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass had made administration of those water rights much 
simpler for the IDWR. Id at 19. 
Dr. Charles Brockway attested to the formation of the Association for the purpose of 
addressing flow obstructions such as man-made ponds that were preventing senior water right 
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users from obtaining their decreed water rights. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at ,r 6. Beaver dams also 
impeded the flow of water in the Broadford Slough which prevented authorized diversions. Id 
Brian Brockette is the lateral manager for the Association and is a duly appointed Deputy 
Water Master for the IDWR. In his Affidavit, Mr. Brockette attested to the significant work that 
has been done by the Association in maintaining the ditches of the Broadford Slough and the 
Rockwell Bypass to facilitate water right delivery. R., Vol. 1, p. 132 at ,r 4. Numerous 
photographs he took are attached to his Affidavit, and he detailed what those photographs 
represent. Additionally, he attached an exhibit to his Affidavit which is a copy of a United States 
Geological Service map from 1986 that shows a blue line emanating from the Big Wood River, 
and generally following the Broadford Road right-of-way. R., Vol. 1, p. 170. The ditch that runs 
alongside the Broadford Road is the man-made Rockwell Bypass ditch. No other ditch or stream 
channel is depicted lying to the west of the Rockwell Bypass. Portions of the Broadford Slough 
ditch below the Rockwell Bypass headgate are located to the west of the Rockwell Bypass 
channel. 
In sum, there is no historical evidence that tended to indicate that the Broadford Slough is 
a natural stream. As indicated by Dr. Brockway in his Affidavit, it has been his experience that 
channels equipped with lockable and controllable headgates to control water diversions are 
considered by the State ofldaho to be canals. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at ,r 4. The evidence from long-
time residents of the Bellevue area show that a wooden headgate existed on the river as early as 
the 1950's. Lacking any evidence that would allow BWR to meet its burden of proof, the district 
court reached the conclusion that the Broadford Slough ditch was not a natural channel even if it 
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once was. Even if the Broadford Slough had been proven by clear and convincing evidence to 
have been a natural channel at the dawn of civilization, the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in 
Dayley, supra, would support the Association's position. Certainly, there is no moving body of 
water or current in the Broadford Slough during the entire irrigation season, a finding which was 
required to constitute a natural water course in Loosli v. Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 481, 162 P.2d 
393 (1945). See also Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd, 119 Idaho 299, 805 P.2d 1223 
(1991 ). In Burgess, the Court found that the Salmon Falls dam had impeded the flow of the creek, 
but that 25 cfs of seepage continued to flow through the abutments of the dam into the original 
channel. As a result, the channel met the criteria of a natural water course because water 
continually flowed in the channel. Kevin Lakey's Affidavit clearly establishes that during the 
irrigation season, checkboards placed in the Broadford Slough allow no water to pass down the 
ditch, with all water being diverted into the Rockwell Bypass for irrigation water right delivery. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ,r 7. The Affidavit of Leroy Lewis attested to the fact that the Broadford 
Slough was dried up in the winter months to prevent flooding. R., Vol. 1, p. 108 at ,r 5. 
This case bears certain similarities to the Court's decision in Independent Irrigation Co. 
Ltd v. Baldwin, 43 Idaho 371, 252 P. 489 (1926). In that case, Independent Irrigation Company 
filed suit against the water master for attempting to prevent the diversion and use of water by the 
Company. The Company claimed an entitlement to use of the water without interference by the 
water master, because they had constructed "a tight and permanent dam maintained by them, 
across the slough." The appellants had been using the water in the slough and the natural springs 
that arose in the slough. The Court stated: 
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The evidence further shows that from the date of the construction of 
the dam by appellants Scott Slough ceased to be a tributary of Snake 
River. 
43 Idaho at 376. Not unlike the case of Independent Irrigation Co., supra, the facts of the instant 
case show that a tight and permanent dike or levee was constructed by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and has operated for more than fifty (50) years. The only water that came into the 
Broadford Slough ditch from that point is water that has been diverted from the Big Wood River 
through the ditch to the Broadford Slough headgate. The fact that water may rise into the slough 
downstream through springs does not change the characterization of the ditch. It is not a natural 
channel, and the Association is entitled to continue to operate, repair and maintain its ditches 
pursuant to the statutes governing lateral ditch water users' associations. More than 100 years ago, 
the California Supreme Court considered a party's claim that a levee placed across a slough did 
not change the character of the slough's channel from being a natural watercourse. The Court in 
Lamb v. Reclamation District No. 108, 73 Cal. 125, 14 P. 625 (1887), rejected that claim. 
The Sacramento River is a large navigable stream, having its 
sources near the boundary line between the states of Oregon and 
California, and running for several hundred miles through the 
northern and central parts of the latter state to the bay of San 
Francisco. In times of high water it frequently overflows its banks. A 
great deal of the adjoining land is lower than the banks of the stream; 
and at times of overflow the surplus water runs down to and over 
such land, where it remains until it evaporates, or, later in the season 
when the river is at a lower stage, runs back into the stream. The 
water at some places pours over the entire bank in continuous sheets 
for considerable distances, but more commonly finds its way out 
through the lower parts, or depressions, of the banks, which of 
course have gradually been worn down deeper and wider by the 
action of the water. These short depressions by which the water gets 
through the banks into the lower lands beyond are called sloughs; 
and Wilkins Slough, mentioned in the complaint, is quite a large 
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depression of that character, and affords means of escape during 
overflows for a considerable quantity of water. The lands thus 
overflowed, and for the protection of which respondent claims the 
right to maintain said levee, are a part of that large body of swamp 
and overflowed land acquired by California from the United States 
by virtue of the act of Congress of September 28, 1850, generally 
known as the Arkansas act. 
73 Cal. at 126. Continuing, the Court stated: 
Counsel for appellant contends that Wilkins Slough is 
within the legal definition of a "watercourse," and argues for the 
application here of the doctrine that one land-owner on a 
watercourse cannot dam it so as to flood the land of his neighbor 
above. But in the first place, appellant is not a riparian owner upon 
Wilkins Slough. His land is two miles away, and divided from it by 
a large navigable river. He has no interest in whatever rights land-
owners on Wilkins Slough, if there were any, might have as 
between themselves. In the second place, we do not think that 
Wilkins Slough, as between appellant and respondent at least, is to 
be treated as a watercourse within the legal meaning of that word. 
It occasionally happens that a river, in its course from its source to 
its mouth, divides into two main, permanent channels, each 
carrying continuously a large part, if not a moiety, of its waters at 
all stages, and either uniting with the other at a lower point, or 
continuing to the sea, leaving a delta between the two. But there is 
nothing here resembling that condition. Wilkins Slough is not a 
channel or fork, continuously carrying a large part, or any part, of 
the waters of the Sacramento River. It carries no water at all except 
"in times of flood," and then the amount which it carries, when 
compared with the volume of water in the river, is insignificant. In 
fact, it has no original water of its own at all, but is simply a 
conduit by which occasionally some of the floodwater of the river 
escapes into the lower lands adjoining. This same office is 
performed by every other low place along the bank; and every 
other part of the levee could be removed as a nuisance if that part 
of it which is at Wilkins Slough can be so removed. Upon this 
point we cannot distinguish the case at bar from the case of S. & B. 
Turnpike Co. v. Green, 99 Ind. 205, where it was held that plaintiff 
could protect his land from overflow of the Big Blue River by 
erecting a levee on its bank at a place where there was "a 
depression washed out across the lands of plaintiff," and where, 
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"when there was a rise in said river, the water passed out over said 
lands of plaintiff," although it caused a greater overflow on the 
premises of defendant, to its damage. 
(Emphasis in original). 73 Cal. at 134-35. 
Whether or not Idaho would embrace the California Court's logic in Lamb, it appears 
that Idaho case law is supportive of the district court's finding in this case. BWR has cited 
Loosli, supra, a case which relied on Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., Ltd., 16 Idaho 
484, 101 P. 1059 (1909) in order to reach its decision. In Hutchinson, supra, this Court stated: 
"Watson slough is now and at all times herein mentioned 
and from time immemorial has been a natural watercourse, 
diverting water from the Snake river, on the west side thereof, and 
two and one-half miles southwest of Blackfoot, in Bingham 
County Idaho, and flowing through the said described land of the 
plaintiff, and on in a general southwesterly direction, emptying its 
waters into the said Snake river, the said watercourse being about 
seven or eight miles in length." 
There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to the natural 
character of Watson slough, -- as to whether or not it had always 
carried a stream of water or whether it was dry during certain 
seasons of the year. It must be conceded, however, that much of 
the evidence sustains the contention that it is a natural watercourse 
and has from time immemorial carried a constant stream of 
water. The court found in favor of this contention. It being 
conceded by both parties that the court entertained the correct view 
of the law as to what constitutes a watercourse, it necessarily 
follows that the court, in arriving at his conclusions of fact, 
necessarily did so in view and understanding of the correct 
principle of law. The presumption is strongly in favor of the 
correctness of the court's finding of fact on that question. Under the 
well-established rule with reference to findings based on 
conflicting evidence, we must sustain the finding on this 
proposition. 
(Emphasis added). 16 Idaho at 488-89. The Court is urged to recall the testimony of Kevin 
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Lakey that no water flows down the Broadford Slough during the irrigation season because it 
was all diverted into the Rockwell Bypass. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at 1 7. Additionally, Leroy Lewis 
attested to the fact that the Broadford Slough had been dried up in the winter months to prevent 
flooding in the Bellevue area. R., Vol. 1, p. 108 at 15. 
The Court will recall the district court's finding in this case that if the Association did 
not undertake work in the channel of the Big Wood River to remove accumulated debris and 
silt during low flow periods, no water would ever get into the Broadford Slough. Only at a point 
below where the Rockwell Bypass rejoined the Broadford Slough channel was it considered to 
have "original water" of its own that resulted in the IDWR characterizing that portion of the 
Broadford Slough channel as a natural watercourse. 
If anyone would have known how the Idaho Department of Water Resources had 
characterized the Broadford Slough as not being a natural stream, it would had to have been 
Terry Blau, the Stream Channel Protection Program Administrator. During his 35 years of 
employment with the IDWR, he was aware that the segment of the Broadford Slough beginning 
at the confluence of the Big Wood River was not regarded as a natural stream until a point 
below where the Rockwell Bypass rejoined the slough, and became a gaining reach. R., Vol. 1, 
p. 83 at 1 5. It was only after that point that the IDWR regarded the channel as a natural stream. 
Id. Were that not the case, it is apparent that any construction activities in the upper reach of the 
slough would have been regulated by the IDWR. 
Mr. Blau, who submitted an Affidavit under oath, stated as follows: 
During the time ofmy employment with the IDWR, and in my role 
as the Stream Channel Protection Specialist, the segment of the 
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Ditch beginning at the confluence of the Big Wood River was not 
regarded as a natural stream until a point below where the 
Rockwell By-pass rejoined the slough and became a gaining reach. 
At that point, the IDWR regarded the channel as a natural stream 
for purposes of regulation under the Stream Channel Alteration 
statutes. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 83 at ,r 5. 
In BWR's opening Brief, as in the trial of this matter, BWR suggested that the 
Association does not have any legal right to charge for the maintenance and operation of the 
Broadford Slough ditch "over which the IDWR has exclusive responsibility." BWR's Opening 
Brief at p. 26. Kevin Lakey, the District 37 Watermaster, was careful to explain that the 
IDWR's responsibility for delivery of irrigation water did not include any responsibility beyond 
diverting water into the Broadford Slough. Tr., p. 190, LL. 1-16. He testified that the ID WR had 
no repair or maintenance responsibility for either the Broadford Slough or the Rockwell Bypass 
channels. Tr., p. 198, LL. 3-10. It is clear that there is nothing in law or practice that obligates 
the IDWR to maintain this or any other irrigation delivery system. Lakey testified that he was 
aware that the Association had conducted substantial work on the ditches and the headgates, 
and that the Association's management of the water rights delivery on the slough and bypass 
made administration simpler for the IDWR. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at 118-9. As the court observed, 
without such maintenance activities being performed on those ditches, surface water rights 
would be incapable of being diverted, conveyed or delivered. R., Vol. 2, p. 396 at 1 14. The 
court also specifically found that the administrative functions of Water District No. 37 ceased at 
the point where water is diverted out of the Big Wood River into the channel leading to the 
Broadford Slough headgate. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at 1 18. Finally, the court found that neither 
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Water District No. 37 nor the IDWR does any maintenance or repair to the ditches of the 
Broadford Slough or the Rockwell Bypass. Id. Even if the Broadford Slough was once a natural 
channel, it is apparent that it is not today. Mr. Lakey responded to a question posed by Judge 
Elgee, and informed him that when the Broadford Slough headgate was closed, water would 
simply back up to the level of the river and stay in the river. Tr., p. 215, LL. 20-24. 
E. More than three parties take their water from a common point of diversion. 
BWR has asserted that the court failed to make a finding that three or more parties take 
their water from a common point of diversion. However, the court did find that all Association 
members' surface water is diverted at the same point in the Big Wood River into the ditch that 
leads to the Broadford Slough headgate. The court specifically found that all of the water 
diverted from the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough ditch is ultimately diverted into 
the Rockwell Bypass. R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at 1 16. Because the membership roster of the 
Association clearly includes more than three parties, and because the court found that all waters 
diverted for the water right owners was necessarily diverted at the same point on the river into 
the Broadford Slough ditch, the Association contends that BWR's arguments in this regard are 
devoid of merit. 
F. The Rockwell Bypass. 
B WR contends that the Rockwell Decree mandates the saved water right holders to 
exclusively maintain the Rockwell Bypass. However, as the court specifically found, 
There is nothing in the Rockwell Decree that provides that the 
saved water right owners have an exclusive obligation to maintain 
the Rockwell Bypass for the benefit of other users. 
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R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at~ 16. As observed by the district court, there are many water users besides 
the saved water right owners whose water rights are transported via the Rockwell Bypass. There 
is nothing that mandated that the half-dozen or so saved water right owners had to get out with 
a pick and shovel to maintain the bypass to the exclusion of other downstream water users 
whose water rights were transported in the Rockwell Bypass channel. More importantly, the 
court acknowledged that there was nothing in the Rockwell Decree that mandated the saved 
water right owners to maintain the first half-mile of the Broadford Slough ditch between the 
Big Wood River and the Rockwell Bypass headgate. If that work wasn't legitimately performed 
by the Association, then no one, including the saved water right owners, would be able to have 
their water rights delivered. The court concluded that there was more maintenance required to 
deliver BWR's water then just the maintenance work to be performed on the Rockwell Bypass 
itself, and there was no exclusive obligation on the part of the Rockwell Bypass saved water 
right owners to maintain the Bypass when many other water users utilized the same delivery 
system. R., Vol. 2, p. 401 ~ 2. 
G. Affirming the district court's decision will not interfere or complicate the state's 
administration of water rights. 
At page 33 of BWR's opening Brief, BWR asserts, ipse dixit, that affirming the district 
court's decision will complicate and interfere with the state's administration of water rights. It is 
interesting to note that the Association had conducted its maintenance activities for a decade 
before BWR made this assertion. It is even more interesting for this Court to note what Kevin 
Lakey stated in his Affidavit regarding the very issue now raised by BWR: 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 23 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
The Association's management of the delivery of water 
rights on the Slough and the Bypass have made the administration 
of those water rights much simpler for the IDWR to administer. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ,i 9. 
H. BWR was not a bona fide purchaser. 
Although not raised as an issue on appeal, BWR has obliquely referred to its arguments 
to the district court that it was a bona fide purchaser ("BFP") without notice of the role of the 
Association. See BWR's Opening Brief at p. 6, fn. 4. Given the possibility that BWR may again 
refer to this argument in its Reply Brief, the Association feels compelled to address it here. 
For someone who casually paid Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000) for a piece of 
property sight unseen, it is indeed curious for BWR to have made the BFP allegation. The 
district court certainly did not buy into that argument, and it specifically found that BWR never 
researched or verified any issues pertaining to the property's water rights, or their means of 
conveyance or delivery, despite the express terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. R., Vol. 
2, p. 394 at ,i 10. The relevant inspection contingency and water right verification language is 
contained in the Wenner/BWR Purchase and Sale Agreement. R., Vol. 2, p. 227. Additionally, 
BWR's policy of title insurance contained an exception to insurance coverage which excludes: 
Any facts, rights, interests or claims which are not shown by the 
public records but which could be ascertained by an inspection of 
the land or by making inquiry of a person in possession thereof. 
R., Vol. 2, p. 242 at ,i 2. 
The district court observed that there was nothing inconsistent with the Association's 
Bylaws and its ability to assess BWR for the delivery of its water under the relevant statutes 
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regardless of BWR's claim that it was a bona fide purchaser. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at 1 20. It is 
apparent that the district court's reference to BWR as a "free rider" was all too appropriate in 
this case. 
The district court was careful to consider the Purchase and Sale Agreement (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 40) with regard to the verification of water right issues during BWR's inspection 
period prior to closing of the transaction. This Court is urged to recall that Marc Richards 
testified that he did nothing insofar as an inspection or analysis of issues related to water rights 
for the property. He acknowledged that he made absolutely no inquiry of anyone with regard to 
any of these issues. In Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 291 P.2d 852 (1955), the Idaho 
Supreme Court commented upon BFP status in the context of a property purchaser, and stated 
as follows: 
It seems to us from the facts that the respondents failed to 
exercise due diligence and to avail themselves of information 
easily obtainable and to which their attention had been directed, 
and they cannot now claim to be bona fide purchasers. (Citations 
omitted). 
77 Idaho at 319. The holding in that case applies equally to the facts of this case. After being 
charged with verifying issues regarding water rights on the property, Richards simply ignored 
the contract, and proceeded to purchase the property for $5,000,000 without making so much as 
an inquiry of anyone regarding the water rights appurtenant to the property, or the manner in 
which they were delivered. If there ever was a situation where someone assumed the risk of a 
lack of inquiry or knowledge, this case presents a compelling example. 
In Adams v. Anderson, 142 Idaho 208, 127 P.3d 111 (2005), this Court made a similar 
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observation: 
A bona fide purchaser is one who, at the time of the purchase, paid 
valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of any 
outstanding adverse rights of another. (Citation omitted). 
Additionally, a person is not a bona fide purchaser if he purchased 
the property with sufficient knowledge to put a reasonably prudent 
person on mqwry. 
142 Idaho at 213. Given the language in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, it is certainly clear 
that BWR was charged with sufficient knowledge to put it on inquiry as to issues pertaining to 
water rights. The fact that Richards testified in both his deposition and during the trial of this 
matter that he elected not to do so deprives him of BFP status. Tr., p. 306, LL. 17-25; p. 307, 
LL. 1-4; p. 311, LL. 3-8 and LL. 23-25. 
I. Robert "Archie" Bouttier possessed both actual and apparent authority to call for 
the delivery ofBWR's water. 
Mr. Bouttier was an original Association member who farmed the property that is now 
owned by BWR. He had resided in the area since the mid-1970's. Tr., p. 146, LL. 19-25. He had 
been familiar with the BWR property since the early seventies. Tr., p. 148, LL. 5-8. At the trial 
of this matter, he described in great detail the relationship that he had with Jann Wenner, the 
former owner of BWR's property. As a result of an arrangement with Wenner, Bouttier testified 
that he maintained and irrigated Wenner's property on an annual basis starting sometime in 
1996 or 1997. Tr., pp. 148-150. Following Mr. Wenner's sale of the property to BWR, Mr. 
Bouttier described his initial meeting with Marc Richards, BWR's sole member. Although he 
offered to show Mr. Richards around the property, Bouttier explained that Richards wasn't 
interested in doing that. Tr., p. 154, LL. 12-15. After informing Richards what he had been 
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doing on the property, Bouttier testified, "And he [Richards] said, well, you can just keep on 
doing what you did with Jann, it looks fine to me." Id. at LL. 17-19. Specifically with regard to 
the water, the following colloquy occurred between BWR's attorney and Mr. Bouttier: 
Q. 
A. 
Fair enough. And you never got to the subject of how the 
water is delivered to the property? 
I asked him if he wanted to go up and I'll show him that 
stuff, and he didn't want to see it. 
Tr., p. 155, LL. 3-7. Finally, Mr. Bouttier testified that between 2006 and 2011, he personally 
called for the delivery of irrigation water from the Association. Tr., p. 156, LL. 10-14. Mr. 
Richards confirmed to Mr. Bouttier that he had purchased Jann Wenner's property sight unseen. 
Tr., p. 161, LL. 18-20. In the court's Findings of Fact, the court found that Bouttier had either 
express or apparent authority to call upon the Association for the conveyance and delivery of 
surface water rights appurtenant to BWR's property. R., Vol. 2, p. 394 at 1 11. It is abundantly 
clear that after having heard the testimony of both Mr. Bouttier and Mr. Richards, the court 
believed the testimony of Mr. Bouttier. See last sentence of Finding of Fact No. 8, R., Vol. 2, p. 
394. The court found that BWR was a member of the Association, and that it received a benefit 
from the Association's activities. R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at 1 17. The court found that a benefit had 
been conferred on BWR by the Association which benefit was not an incidental benefit. Id. The 
court found that BWR was aware of that benefit by virtue of its knowledge that its property had 
been irrigated. Id. The court found that the Association had rendered such benefit with the 
expectation that it would be paid in accordance with the applicable statutes. Id. Finally, the 
court found that even if not pled, the parties implicitly tried the issues of unjust enrichment 
and/or quantum meruit in the trial of this matter consistent with with IRCP Rule 15(b ). Id. 
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One final comment is warranted with respect to BWR's assertion that it knew little, if 
anything, regarding the irrigating, farming and grazing activities that took place on its property. 
This Court should view Mr. Richards' assertions in this regard with some degree of skepticism 
and incredulity. Mr. Richards was asked to explain how he could have obtained an agricultural 
tax exemption (Exhibit No. 536) which indicated that BWR's property was operated on a crop 
share basis. Richards acknowledged that, "Archie Bouttier was taking the hay and the alfalfa off 
the property, and had his horses there eating it." Tr., p. 321, LL. 6-7. When asked if Archie 
Bouttier was the one who was irrigating BWR's property, Mr. Richards responded, "I would 
assume so." Tr., p. 321, L. 22. Exhibit No. 537 admitted into evidence was a second Blaine 
County agricultural tax exemption form. In that document, Mr. Richards testified that he had 
checked the box to indicate that the property was "owner-operated." Tr., p. 324, LL. 16-25. As 
part of obtaining the agricultural tax exemption, Richards had advised Blaine County that he 
had planted 35 or more acres of oat hay during the previous year. When questioned about that 
supposed activity, he testified that although that is what he had written there, he really hadn't 
planted anything. Tr., p. 325, LL. 1-6. His representation to Blaine County was simply untrue. 
Despite having purchased a $5,000,000 piece of property in a sight unseen condition, the 
testimony of Mr. Richards made it clear that he had little, if any, knowledge as to what actually 
took place on his property. Many of his answers at trial were simply "I don't know," or "I don't 
recall." See, e.g., Tr., p. 326-330. 
It became very apparent, and the court specifically found, that the elements of both 
unjust emichment and quantum meruit were clearly satisfied. BWR received a benefit from the 
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Association with regard to the maintenance of the irrigation water delivery system, and the 
actual delivery of irrigation water to BWR's property. Contrary to BWR's arguments, there is no 
basis, statutory or otherwise, that would allow an Association member to opt out of 
membership in the Association, and then to later opt in. See Finding of Fact No. 19 at R., Vol. 
2, p. 398 at ,r 19. 
The district court found that the Association conferred a substantial benefit upon BWR's 
property and that the Association's assessments were proper and correctly calculated based 
upon the statutory provisions. See Finding of Fact Nos. 17, 20, 21, and 22. R., Vol. 2, pp. 397-
399. The court found that neither the IDWR nor Water District No. 37 provided any product or 
service to BWR or to the other members of the Association beyond the diversion of water out 
of the Big Wood River. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at ,r 18. The court found that the administrative 
functions of Water District No. 37 cease at the point where water is diverted out of the Big 
Wood River into the channel leading to the Broadford Slough headgate. Id Neither Water 
District No. 37 nor the IDWR do any maintenance or repair on the Broadford Slough or the 
Rockwell Bypass. Id. 
It seems evident that BWR was more interested in being a "free rider" insofar as the 
Association was concerned, and despite having spent $5,000,000 to purchase its property, Mr. 
Richards was not about to pay annual assessments for the delivery of the irrigation water, even 
though they amounted to less than $1,300 per year. This Court should reject the arguments 
made by BWR, and should affirm the Findings and Conclusions of the district court. 
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Association asserts that attorney fees are warranted in this case pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 42-1307. That section reads: 
42-1307. Action for assessment - Attorneys' fees. - In case any 
assessment, as herein provided for is due and unpaid the association 
may sue to collect the same, in the name of its secretary-treasurer as 
such, in any court of competent jurisdiction, and in addition to the 
amount due including all penalties and interest, and all costs incurred 
in said action, may collect a reasonable attorneys' fee in such action 
to be fixed by the court. 
Just as the district court found that the Association was entitled to recover its costs and attorney 
fees below, this Court should arrive at a similar conclusion on appeal. 
The Association also contends that Idaho Code § § 12-120( 1) and (3) provide an additional 
basis for an award of costs and attorney fees in this case. The amount sought to be recovered by 
the Association was clearly less than $25,000, and BWR acknowledged that it had received the 
written invoices from the Association for payment of delinquent assessments. Tr., p. 28, LL. 2-18. 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) affords a prevailing party the right to recover fees on an open account for 
services in a commercial transaction. 
Finally, the Association believes that costs and fees should appropriately be awarded 
under Idaho Code § 12-121, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. The Association contends that 
BWR's appeal, not unlike its case below, was brought and defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
and without foundation. 
Under any or all of the statutory provisions enumerated above, an award of costs and fees 
to the Association would be appropriate. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Association was validly formed by three or more parties who take water from the 
same point where it is diverted out of the Big Wood River into the ditch leading to the Broadford 
Slough headgate. The Association agrees with the district court that the terms "ditch" and "canal" 
are synonymous with one another for purposes of Title 42 of the Idaho Code. All of the 
Association members' irrigation water is diverted from the Big Wood River at the same point, and 
is then conveyed via a ditch to the members' respective properties. 
The Association was formed out of necessity in order to insure that necessary maintenance 
and repair work was done within the channels of the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass. 
Additionally, the district court recognized the necessity of undertaking work with mechanized 
equipment in the channel of the Big Wood River in order to allow water to be diverted into the 
ditch that led to the Broadford Slough headgate. Without undertaking that work, the court found 
that no water rights could be delivered during low flow periods because of the build-up of debris, 
silt and rock. Nothing in the Rockwell Decree obligated the saved water right owners to venture 
above the Rockwell Bypass headgate to do any work in the Big Wood River, or in the half-mile 
ditch leading from the river to the Broadford Slough headgate. 
Marc Richards expressly authorized Robert "Archie" Bouttier to run BWR's property just 
as he had done in previous years for Jann Wenner. In doing so, Bouttier necessarily had to call 
upon the Association for the delivery of the irrigation water rights appurtenant to BWR's property. 
Mr. Richards' rationale as to why he should be a "free rider" was never clearly articulated as found 
by the district court. 
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Richards testified repeatedly that although Big Wood Ranch 
received surface water every year, Big Wood Ranch received no 
benefit. Nor does Richards believe that he receives any benefit by the 
efforts of the Association, or anyone else, to maintain the stream 
between the main channel of the Big Wood River and the Broadford 
Slough headgate. 
R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at ,i 17. The Association contends that Richards' position was always one of 
pure obstinacy, and that there never was any legal basis or foundation for BWR's claims made in 
the Complaint, or in its defense of the Association's Counterclaim. 
The decision of the district court should be affirmed, and costs and attorney fees should be 
awarded to the Association. In 1927, the Idaho legislature provided a mechanism that allowed 
water users to unite to form an organization such as this Association. The legislature recognized 
the need for such cooperative efforts at that time, and the efforts of the Association in conducting 
those activities ninety years later should not be thwarted today. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
--1--
of April, 2014. 
ROBERTSON&, SLETTE, PLLC 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 32 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
The undersigned certifies that on the of April, 2014, he caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
Patrick J. Miller 
Givens Pursley 
601 W. Bannock St. 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
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